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“The Option of the Judicial Path”
Disputes over Marriage, Divorce, and Extra-Marital Sex in Colonial
Courts in Libreville, Gabon (1939-1959)
Rachel Jean-Baptiste
1 In April of 1956, a plaintiff named Bernard Koula presented what should have been a
rather straightforward case for a conciliation hearing before native assessors of the first-
degree court for the city of Libreville1. Like hundreds of other men in the post-World War
II  period,  Koula solicited the native court  system to affirm his  rights over his  wife’s
person, sexual access, and reproductive capacities according to “customary law”. Koula
brought the charge of adultery against a man named Michel Ondo. Koula accused Ondo of
having had sexual relations with his wife, Aguès Moutombi, and further testified that she
had been living with Ondo for the past two years. Moutombi had rebuffed Koula’s efforts
to compel her to reside in their conjugal home. Accepting that there was no possibility of
his  wife’s  return,  Koula  demanded  that  Ondo  pay  him a  fine  for  the  adultery  and
reimburse him the bridewealth that he had disbursed to Moutombi’s mother.
2 Ondo admitted to having had sexual relations with Moutombi, but in a surprising turn he
countered  that  she  and  Koula  were  not  legitimately  married.  Ondo  insisted  that
Moutombi was still an unmarried woman since she had never left the home of her natal
family to live with Koula. Ondo refused to pay an adultery fee and reimburse bridewealth
on the grounds that Koula was not her husband and therefore did not control sexual
access to her.  Moutombi testified that though Ondo had remitted bridewealth to her
family, she had never consented to marry Koula and did not consider him her husband.
She argued that her family accepted Ondo’s bridewealth against her will and concurred
that she had never left her natal home to live in a residence provided by Koula. With the
statement  that  she  “denies  that  she  belongs  to  either  Koula  or  Ondo”,  Moutombi
contended that neither her lover nor the man who claimed to be her husband had rights
over her person2.
3 What  was  at  stake  in  this  case  was  the  question  of  what  constituted  a  legitimate
marriage–was a woman’s consent to marry necessary or could her family and a suitor
enter into a marriage agreement against her will? The court dismissed Koula’s claim for
an  adultery  payment  on  the  grounds  that  he  and  Moutombi  were  not  legitimately
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married. Koula had remitted bridewealth, but Moutombi never co-habitated with Koula.
In  dismissing  Koula’s  suit,  the  native  assessors  suggested  that  the  consecration  of
marriage was dependent upon the consent of the bride in question, not on the decision of
her family to accept bridewealth from a suitor. The twists, turns, and outcomes in the
case  involving  Koula,  Moutombi,  and  Ondo  demonstrate  that  far  from  maintaining
husbands’ control over their wives, native and colonial courts in the post-World War II
era  were  arenas  in  which  men  and  women  debated,  drew,  and  redrew  conjugal
boundaries. While most of the Estuary region’s inhabitants did settle conjugal conflict
outside of court, within extended kin networks, many of the Estuary’s inhabitants also
solicited courts to settle their affairs3.
4 This article analyzes surviving court registers for Libreville and the rural areas of the
Estuary region from 1939 to 1959. The varied changes in the court system in the post-WWII
period reflected the multi-layered, shifting, and complex nature of power, custom and
law.  At  stake  was  political  authority,  control  over  economic  resources,  and  the
establishment of moral  and social  order in a period of  socio-economic change,  social
dislocation,  and migration.  In native and colonial  courts  husbands,  wives,  and lovers
struggled to define what constituted marriage, the rights of men and women in conjugal
relations and the conditions and terms in which conjugal ties could be severed. Tension
points in court hearings arose around questions of the payment and reimbursement of
bridewealth,  wife  kidnapping,  divorce,  and  adultery.  This  article  contributes  to  the
revisionist literature of colonial courts, customary law, and conjugal practice to argue
that the very process of defining customary law in post-World War II Gabon was marked
by simultaneous moments of rigidity and ambiguity, thereby creating spaces for African
men and women to propose varied visions of conjugal and sexual relations4.
The Uneven Topography of the Native Court System, 1939-1955 
5 As colonial administrators, missionaries, and senior African men offered varied policies
to facilitate  the establishment  and maintenance of  African marriages,  the process  of
reforming  the  native  court  system  to  enforce  these  directives  was  critical.  As  the
momentum for the expansion of African self-governance in other parts of Africa grew,
colonial  officials  and  African  men  in  Gabon  struggled  over  who  had  authority  to
determine  and  enforce  customary  law.  In  the  decades  after  World  War  II,  alliances
between senior Gabonese men and the colonial state were never assured, yet remained
tenuous and at times non-existent. There was no uniform group that could be referred to
as  “senior  African  men”  in  twentieth  century  colonial  Gabon.  Chiefs  and  mission-
educated colonial civil servants disagreed over competing definitions of “custom” and
how to incorporate “customary law” with Christian and French practices. Who had the
right to preside over courts and decide conjugal status? What bodies of custom and/or
law  where  arbitrators  to  look  towards  in  making  their  decisions?  At  the  heart  of
contentions between chiefs and local colonial officials was the reoccurring question of the
degree to which colonial governance was to include direct or indirect rule.
6 Félix Éboué connected questions over the reform of customary law and conjugal practice
to the reform of colonial governance in Native Social Policy. Éboué (1942: 20-21) argued
that native judges, not Frenchmen, should be formally invested with the authority to
preside over  first  degree courts  “in allowing questions of  state  of  persons–marriage,
divorce, adultery, the conferring of natural children, inheritance–to be settled in the first
instance by native judges alone”.  Éboué argued that French administrators’  desire to
grant African women more freedom than that allowed in native societies had gone too
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far. French magistrates granted African women’s requests for divorce too frequently and
women committed adultery with little fear of impunity. The period of tutelage in which
Frenchmen guided African assessors in administering the laws of “civilization” had come
to an end. Native judges, he argued, were best suited to determine which combination
customary and French law would preserve marriages5.
7 Senior administrators appointed after Éboué were less keen to invest African judges with
such formal authority in the colonial  legal  system, yet did concede some measure of
formal African participation in directly administering native justice. In July 1944, senior
French administrators in Brazzaville decided appointed a new layer to colonial courts in
French Equatorial Africa (FEA). Customary courts, also known as courts of common law,
were to be staffed exclusively by Africans. The judges would usually be customary chiefs
and they were to preside over civil and commercial disputes between Africans according
to customary law6.
8 However, customary courts were charged with settling non-criminal litigation between
African  populations  except cases  relating  to:  “the  state  of  persons,  the  family,  child
custody, marriage and divorce” which would remain under the jurisdiction of first degree
courts presided over by a French president assisted by native assessors7. In a circular to
individual  governors,  Governor  General  Bayardelle  urged  that  first  degree  courts
administered  by  French  judges  assume  the  role  as  “guarantor  and  guardian  of  the
institution of marriage” by ruling for divorces in limited circumstances8. According to the
decrees  drawn by French colonial  representatives,  in  the post-World War II  era,  the
multi-layered colonial legal system was to be an arena in which the stability of African
marriages  was  to  be  maintained.  The following diagram illustrates  the colonial  legal
system as it was officially mapped out from 1939 to 1955.
 
Colonial court system, 1939-1955
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9 In practice, the native court system was a chaotic network of multiple sites of dispute
resolution–chiefs continued to preside over “courts” that were not officially sanctioned
by the colonial state and rendered judgments that demarcated conjugal boundaries. In a
1948 letter to the governors of FEA colonies, Governor-General Luizet signaled that laws
establishing the new legal system were far from being followed9. Luizet pointed out that
in many regions, in addition to first and second degree courts, unsanctioned native courts
were operating on an ad hoc basis without formal dates for hearings being established or
a state appointed native assessor or  président present.  Furthermore,  no records were
maintained of these proceedings; they were only oral and not transcribed in registers.
What  was  more  troublesome,  Governor-General  Luizet  pointed  out,  was  that  these
hearings had strayed from their intended purpose of reconciliation and in fact rendered
judgments in areas that exceeded their mandate. Firmly stating that this state of affairs
could not continue, the governor-general instructed colonial governors to ensure that the
new customary  courts  be  established,  that  each  of  these  courts  were  to  maintain  a
register of litigants, the nature of the conflict, the agreement reached upon, and if an
appeal was sought. The Governor-General ended the letter by reinforcing that customary
courts were to defer to first and second degree courts all cases dealing with marriage,
divorce,  etc.  and that each district head was to complete monthly inspections of  the
courts and send a report to the attorney general and the political affairs office10.
10 Although first and second degree courts were to preside over all  cases of divorce,  in
reality these courts rarely settled such matters. The Estuary’s inhabitants continued to
look to chiefs to arbitrate conflicts over marriage, divorce, and bridewealth and chiefs
were not content to let this power erode. In a 1946 circular to governors of individual AEF
colonies,  Governor-General Bayardelle acknowledged that first degree courts presided
over only a small number of divorce cases, as the region’s inhabitants preferred to settle
disagreements “according to custom” before chiefs or other elder men11.
11 Despite  the  letter  of  the  law that  granted  colonial  officials  exclusive  authority  over
marriage  and divorce,  local  administrators  in  Gabon relied  on chiefs  to  manage  the
numerous conjugal disputes that threatened to overwhelm colonial administration and
day-to-day duties12. Local colonial employees in Gabon sought to reinforce rather than
detract from the authority of chiefs in settling civil household disputes. Local officials
wished  that  civil  conflicts  between  African populations  be  settled  in  arbitration  by
African judges instead of  first  degree courts.  In response to a letter of  complaint by
Estuary chiefs that many litigants failed to follow their judgments, the commander of the
Estuary region, Tastevin, cautioned the administrator of the subdivision of Libreville:
“Such  a  state  of  affairs  can  have  serious  political  consequences.  For  the  good
reputation of the administration, in order to maintain our prestige before those we
administrate, it is essential that the sanctions that we administer, whatever they
may be, whether we declare them directly or by the intervention of notables, are
strictly applied. It is also our duty and in our interest to support the action of our
conciliator-judges,  in  order  to  give  them  authority  over  the  populations.  In
addition, I urge you to follow the settling of palavers very closely and to watch over
so  that  decisions  reached in  arbitration  are  executed.  If  they  are  not  followed,
arraign those who have defaulted before your civil  and commercial  first  degree
court”13.
12 For  local  officials  in  Gabon,  chiefs  and  native  assessors  were  the  direct  mouthpiece
through which they governed.  Local  officials  did not  want to be encumbered by the
frequent  instances  of  household  disagreements,  yet  wanted  the  decisions  taken  by
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appointed native authorities to be viewed by populations as the official judgment of the
colonial state. Although the colonial state articulated a legal system based on direct rule
in which French judges would determine the status of persons, on the ground, chiefs and
the populations they represented redrew conjugal boundaries through indirect rule.
13 However,  chiefs  did  not  exercise  hegemonic  power  over  the  populations  that  they
administered.  In  the  post-war  colonial  order,  chiefs  held  an  ambiguous  and shifting
position of  power.  Chiefs  were caught  in the position of  needing the support  of  the
colonial state in order to reinforce their authority,  yet also seeking to supercede the
limits that colonial rule placed upon them. Moreover, litigants unhappy with judgments
decided upon in customary courts directly solicited colonial administrators to settle their
disputes14. In a 1943 letter, a group of Libreville neighborhood and Estuary village chiefs
wrote a letter of complaint to the Governor in Libreville that their authority over the
settling of disputes was eroding:
“In the settlement of legal disputes, palavers by chiefs are often annulled, either at
city hall, or at the subdivision or judged directly by the native courts of first and
second degree without preliminary discussion with chiefs in question, etc. Those
who belong to the Administrative Authority should reinforce the authority of chiefs
and not destroy or erode it, even less to diminish it”15.
14 Given the existence of multiple legal arenas, Libreville’s inhabitants could strategize as to
which of the varied courts would be more likely to enforce their conceptions of their
conjugal status. Courts were spaces in which competing versions of customary law could
articulated, interpreted, or thrown out.
Customary Courts: Negotiating Women’s Aspirations for Divorce and Remarriage and
Men’s Aspirations for Marriage 
15 Husbands went to court seeking the native authorities to grant them control over their
wives’ person, sexuality, reproductive capacities, and labor, yet customary courts often
granted women’s  requests  for  the  dissolution of  their  marriages.  The only  surviving
register  for  a  customary  court  in  the  archives  is  that  of  the  third  district  of  the
subdivision of Libreville. From November 1950 through May 1955, the customary court
heard and rendered judgments in 181 complaints16. Of the total number of cases over this
five year period, 107 cases or fifty-nine percent concerned questions of marriage, divorce,
and bridewealth. These were precisely the types of cases over which they had no official
jurisdiction. Almost all the litigants were Fang, reflecting that ninety five percent of the
subdivision’s inhabitants were of this ethnicity. The court register identifies the names,
ages, and villages of residence of plaintiffs and defendants and a brief one-paragraph
summary  of  the  case.  This  summary  includes  the  plaintiff’s  charge,  the  defendant’
response, if s/he contests the plaintiff’s claims, and the decision taken by the tribunal.
This cursory summary of proceedings might include one or two sentences by the wife or
woman in question. Some of the cases provide some of the context in which disputes were
taking place, while other summaries detail only the plaintiff’s complaint and the judges’
decision.
16 The following chart summarizes the categories of cases brought before the court during
this five-year period. Some of cases filed before the courts involved multiple complaints,
thereby resulting in a total of 113 complaints in 107 court cases17.
17 Of  the  113  complaints,  ninety-six  percent  of  the  plaintiffs  were  men,  nearly  always
husbands.  In ninety-eight percent of these cases,  husbands brought suits,  not against
their  wives,  but  most  frequently  against  rival  suitors  or  against  women’s  male  kin.
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Disputes presented before the court involved struggles between individual men over the
meaning and terms of  marriage–establishing who was  the legitimate husband of  the
woman in  question,  what  rights  and obligations  this  entailed,  the  terms in  which a
marriage divorce could be obtained and contractual obligations in the remittance and
reimbursement of bridewealth. About one third of the suits involved litigation between
husbands and their in-laws. Husbands rarely went
18 before the court soliciting a divorce. Only four percent of marriage cases from 1950-1955
involved  a  husband’s  petition  for  a  divorce18.  Men  brought  complaints  before  the
customary court primarily seeking the return of their wives who were taking refuge with
kin or lovers. Nearly sixty percent of the cases presented before the court were disputes
between men claiming rights to a given woman through accusations of wife kidnapping,
adultery  and/or  claims  to  levirate.  Husbands  also  sought  monetary  compensation–
payment from wives’ lovers as restitution for unauthorized sexual access, payment from
women’s kin for accepting bridewealth from a rival suitor, and the reimbursement of
bridewealth in occurrences in which a marriage did not take place or parties had agreed
to  dissolution.  The summaries  of  bridewealth cases  do  not  provide  enough detail  to
ascertain the terms of the debates. These summaries merely state the amount for which
the plaintiff was suing, followed by the judge’s decision to award or deny the amount19.
Thus,  the  presentation  of  bridewealth  disputes  in  particular,  as  well  as  the  other
categories  presents  the  impression  that  women  and  rights  over  their  persons  were
objects to be bartered over by groups of men. Husbands particularly sought to control
their wives’ sexuality by prosecuting women’s lovers.
 
Summary of complaints before the customary court of the third canton of the subdivision of
Libreville November 1950-May 1955
19 Choruses of chiefs, elite African men, missionaries, and colonial officials advocating the
reform of conjugal law and practice maintained agreement on adultery by women as the
most blatant threat to the stability of African marriages. However, they proposed distinct
strategies to stem the tide. Fang custom defined adultery as an act of theft against a
woman’s husband. Mba’s essay on customary law summarizes the common practice that
“the  Adultery  of  a  married  woman is  severely  punished  with  beatings  and corporal
punishment, etc. because it is considered theft and the accomplice pays a fine to wronged
husband” (Mba 1938). As the wronged party, the husband had the right to seek restitution
not only from his wife, but her lover. Husbands punished adulterous wives with beatings,
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temporary or permanent repudiation, and increased surveillance. Before a public forum,
husbands also sought restitution from their wives’ lovers. The Pahouin Congress set the
fines to be assessed for a first time offender as 500 francs and for the recidivist as 1,000
francs.
20 Colonial and missionary representatives argued that the practice of husbands receiving
monetary compensation from their wives’ lovers for adultery amounted to sanctioning
prostitution20. This was especially acute in villages near timber camps in which husbands
knew that their wives were engaging in sexual relations with other men, yet permitted it
to happen knowing that they could receive money if they brought the lover before a court
presided  over  by  a  chief.  Even  if  a  pregnancy  did  result  from  the  extra-marital
relationship, the child would go to the husband since having paid bridewealth granted
him rights over any children his wife bore. The 1945 Penal Code for French Equatorial
Africa made adultery a criminal offence under which both the wife and lover could be
fined and/or imprisoned21. Yet, few husbands sought the criminal prosecution of their
wives or their lovers for adultery22. In 1942, under the urging of the governor, a gathering
of missionaries and Estuary village chiefs proposed an additional document codifying
Fang conjugal customary law. The conveners decreed, “No payment can be demanded for
adultery.  Those who traffic in this way will  be severely punished”23 In spite of these
directives, monetary compensation continued to be the avenue through which husbands
sought to bolster their exclusive rights to determine sexual access to their wives.
21 For husbands presenting complaints of adultery, the courtroom represented an arena in
which they could restore their honor by having their wives’ lovers publicly admit to the
affair and condemned to remit just compensation. Wives did not play a major role in the
proceedings of adultery cases. The legal dispute was between her husband and her lover
who had sexual relations without authorization from and compensation to the husband24.
The  summaries  of  adultery  cases  reveal  little  by  way  of narrative  detail,  witness
testimonies, and judges’ deliberations in coming to a decision. Case summaries usually
consisted of the plaintiff’s statement that the defendant had committed “adultery” or
“sexual  relations”  with  his  wife,  the  amount  requested  by  the  plaintiff,  followed by
subsequent admittance to the affair if the defendant previously denied it, and the judges’
award of monetary compensation25.
22 Compensation from the lover to the husband confirmed that husbands who had entered
into a legitimate marriage with their wives “owned” their wives’ bodies and control over
sexual  access  to  her.  Summaries  of  adultery  cases  do  not  provide  details  into  how
husbands proved themselves to be the legitimate spouse and what criteria judges used to
determine if a relationship was a formal marriage. However, in all of the thirty adultery
cases heard from November 1950 through October 1954, the customary court ruled in
favor of the husband and ordered the lover to pay a fine directly to the husband26. As
outlined by the case of Nzé Meyo versus Bekale Benguema, the order to pay an adultery
fee was punishment for “having admitted to having sexual relations with a woman who
did not belong to you”27. In between 1950 and 1955 fines varied from as low as 500 francs
to higher judgments of 5,000 francs. Lovers who had pursued an extra-marital affair with
a woman on several occasions or had sexual relations with a woman in the conjugal home
were assessed a hefty fine of 2,500 to 5,000 francs28. The court also levied the higher fees
of 5,000 francs on lovers who attempted to convince the wife to divorce her current
husband and marry him29. Court transcribers used the phrases “to turn her head” or “give
her a bad head” to describe to efforts by lovers to convince wives to transform episodic
“The Option of the Judicial Path”
Cahiers d’études africaines, 187-188 | 2007
7
extra marital relations into a legitimate marriage30. The language used in the adjudication
of adultery suits presents women as passive vessels being acted upon, thereby erasing the
factor that women were usually complicit in seeking out and maintaining extra marital
sexual relationships.
23 Although  husbands  were  identified  as  plaintiffs  in  nearly  all  of  the  cases  before
customary courts,  what  brought  men to  court  was  that  their  wives,  or  women they
claimed  as  their  wives,  initiated  the  conjugal  crisis.  Women  had  either  committed
adultery,  run  away  with  and  sometimes  married  other  men,  had  abandoned  their
conjugal home to return to their kin and ask for a divorce, or, as widows, refused to
marry their deceased husband’s heir. In his essay on customary law Léon Mba stated, “the
Fang woman had no legal power” (Mba 1938: 75). This was not so categorical in the post-
War era. Though women did not directly present themselves before customary courts,
they did so through the intermediary of male kin or a lover. While the legal language and
forum of  adjudicating domestic  conflict,  did not  formally recognize women as  active
agents in determining conjugal status, the strategies made by women in seeking out other
men facilitated their desired outcome of divorce.
24 Accounts of  Fang customary law after  World War II  acknowledged that  Fang custom
allowed divorce, yet sought to restrict the parameters in which dissolution could take
place. Since nearly all requests for divorce emanated from women, senior African men
and colonial  representatives codifying customary law sought to limit  the grounds on
which women could seek a divorce. Mba’s essay stated that a Fang woman, “assisted by he
who had received bridewealth, is authorized by custom to ask for a divorce against her
husband” in specific instances 31. A woman could ask for a divorce if her husband lacked
respect, refused to aid, or caused bodily harm to her kin, inflicted grave bodily harm on
her, and if he committed adultery with a woman in her family. The essay pointedly stated
that a woman could not ask for a divorce in case of her husband’s sterility. The 1942
Project to Regulate Marriage among Fang Natives sought to limit “frivolous” demands for
divorce  by  wives  married according to  custom,  yet  to  allow leeway for  women who
converted to Christianity the right to divorce husbands who had not also converted32.
Women in customary marriages could only solicit a divorce if they fit into two criteria:
they were the second or subsequent wife in a polygynous marriage or were subject to
cruelty and severe ill-treatment in their marriages33. Relatives or other third parties who
encouraged  women’s  requests  for  divorce  and  women  who  deserted  their  husbands
outside of the approved parameters were subject to “severe punishment”. The native
Penal Code made “abandonment of the conjugal domicile by wife without probable cause”
a crime that could result in a prison term34.  Although revisions of customary law and
newly proposed criminal laws sought to limit the parameters within which a woman
could leave her husband, women continued to access several avenues and the customary
court often ruled for a judgment of divorce.
25 Husbands sought out customary courts to counterbalance the influence yielded by their
wives’ kin in determining whether a marriage would be maintained or ruptured and to
ensure  that  they received  reimbursement  of  their  bridewealth  if  women’s  relatives
retained their wives. The primary locale in which most women unhappy in their marriage
took refuge was with their natal families. Husbands sued their in-laws in customary court
on grounds that they were illegally retaining their wife. They argued that, as legitimate
husbands, they maintained rights over their wives’ person. Though some women went
away without the authorization of their husbands, many women sojourned with their
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husband’s authorization to visit or attend to a sick relation or receive care themselves if
they were ill35. Wives refused to return to their conjugal home, sometimes requesting that
a specific grievance be addressed or requesting an outright divorce. The brief transcripts
of the cases rarely detail why the wife is seeking a divorce. A few cases do indicate alleged
motives such as child marriage, while other women charged their husbands’ relatives
with witchcraft, and others claimed excessive physical abuse or lack of respect for their
natal families36. The summary of court proceedings do not record husbands’ responses to
allegations levied by their wives nor the grounds upon which chiefs made their decisions.
However, the overwhelming number of cases in which chiefs ruled for divorce indicates
that senior men were not want to force women whose natal custodians supported their
claims for divorce to return to conjugal residences.
26 Native judges allowed a divorce in seventy-two percent of cases in which a husband sued
his wife’s kin for her abandonment37. Chiefs were not willing to allow women to re-enter
society as unmarried women completely bereft of social control. While these rulings do
indicate some measure of allowing women to determine their conjugal status, rulings for
divorce also reinforced some measure of patriarchal and familial control in that rights in
persons over women were transferred only with the consent of the male natal custodian38
.  However,  all  rulings  of  divorce  also  involved  the  judgment  that  the  wife’s  family
reimburse the husband an agreed upon amount of bridewealth.
27 Given  the  large  number  of  bridewealth  cases  that  also  appeared  before  the  court,
women’s kin often defaulted on the reimbursements and former husbands often had to
seek the intervention of the court in order to receive payment. The proceedings involving
Meyo Mba, his wife Assengone Meyo, and her brother Mefague Mendong in February 1952
are representative of many of the cases involving abandonment. As was customary when
ones’ wife went to her family of origin to air conjugal grievances, Emane Bekale pursued
Assengone Meyo in an effort to reconcile39.  After she refused to return with him and
asked for a divorce, he sued her brother Mba Nkile in court. Yet, the court allowed the
divorce, along with the reimbursement of Emane Bekale’s 25,000 francs in bridewealth
because Mba Nkile “consented to the dissolution of his sister’s marriage”.
28 It was cooperation of male kin who had negotiated and accepted bridewealth from her
current husband–her father, brothers, or uncles–that most determined whether or not a
woman’s claims for divorce would be successful if contested by her husband in customary
court. The customary court ruled in favor of husbands’ suits and ordered the wife to
return to the marital home only in cases in which the wife or her male relative conceded
to reconciliation.  Wives appearing before the court  rarely indicated a preference for
remaining  in  their  marriages–the  only  such  suit  was  that  of  Ekobeang  Edang  who
indicated in a 1951 hearing that, “in spite of everything that has happened, she does not
want to leave her husband, her hope is still with him”40.  In the presence of the court
Edang’s brother, who had been named as the defendant, reaccepted bridewealth from his
brother-in-law Esso-MBA and Edang returned to the conjugal residence. African judges did
not concede to women’s wishes for divorce if her natal custodian agreed to allow her to
return to her husband41.
29 Fathers or brothers often retained custody of women only as a means to compel their son
or  brother-in-law to  complete  bridewealth  payments42.  Such was  the  case  of  Essema
Essono who sued his brother-in-law Ndong Obiangue on the grounds that, “I married his
sister named Ntsam who has abandoned the conjugal domicile for several months without
my authorization. When I was absent from my house and left the key with my wife, my
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brother-in-law stole 4,000 francs from me”43. Court assessors then asked Nstam Ondo if
she wanted to return to her husband to which she replied, “no, since my husband did not
allow me to stay peacefully at his house and he has let me enter by the option of the
judicial path, I cannot return in this case”. Ntsam chastised her husband and his failure to
remit bridewealth in a timely manner as precipitating the events that brought them
before the court. The judges then asked Nstam Ondo’s brother if he consented to his
sister’s wish for the dissolution of the marriage. Ndong Obiangue responded that he did
not consent to her divorce, merely sought the 5,000 francs of bridewealth that Essama
Essono had agreed to pay. The court ordered the wife to return to her husband and that
he remit the remaining bridewealth.
30 The court, however, was not prepared to uniformly assert husbands’ rights over their
wives if husbands had failed to pay regular installments of the promised bridewealth44.
The court held the remittance of bridewealth as the crucial factor that made a marriage
legitimate and gave a husband rights over his wife’s person and the reimbursement of
bridewealth as the process formalizing the dissolution of a marriage.  Yet what about
disputes in which two men had paid or were prepared to make bridewealth payments and
each claimed to be legitimately married to the same woman?
31 Another avenue for women unhappy with their marriages to negotiate a way out was to
find a lover who would reimburse her first husband’s bridewealth. As with charges of
adultery, abandonment, and bridewealth, men soliciting the intervention of the court in
struggles over levirate and wife-kidnapping did not name their wives as defendants, but
rather their wives’ lovers or male relatives. The goal was not to punish his wife, but to
establish that her suitor or male relative had made illegitimate claims over his wife. A
plaintiff bringing the complaint of wife kidnapping or a dispute over levirate before the
customary court sought to establish that he was the legal  husband of  the woman in
question.  Such  plaintiffs  sought  the  woman’s  return  and  compensation  from  the
illegitimate  suitor  for  having  robbed  him  of  her  labor  and  sexual  access.  In  many
instances, the wife’s family had even accepted bridewealth from her lover without having
yet reimbursed her first husband, thereby incurring the thorny question of who was her
legitimate husband45. In cases in which the wife had returned to her husband’s home, he
demanded  only  monetary  compensation  from  her  lover  for  having  temporarily
absconded  with  his  wife.  In  disputes  over  levirate  the  plaintiff  claimed  to  be  the
legitimate husband of the widow since he was the heir of her deceased husband. The
defendant countered either that he was the rightful heir or that the widow be granted a
divorce  from her  defunct  husband’s  family  and  marry  him.  Men  claiming  rights  to
levirate also often charged the defendant with wife kidnapping if the woman in question
had left the residence of her deceased husband to live with the defendant.
32 Charges of wife kidnapping were a misnomer since women were usually complicit  in
absconding with their lovers. At the heart of complaints involving wife kidnapping and
levirate was the question of whether or not women could chose their own husbands.
Native assessors Andre Mbolo and Bernard Mba, assisting in a 1941 criminal case in which
a  man  was  charged  with  kidnapping  a  widow,  stated  “Fang  custom  commands  the
reimbursement of bridewealth if the woman had voluntarily followed her ravisher”46. In
seventy-five percent of kidnapping cases in which the wife insisted on remaining with
her new husband, the court ruled for divorce between the wife and her first husband,
thereby legitimizing the woman’s preference for the second marriage47. Judges ruling for
divorce sought to ensure that the wife in question would be transferred into a conjugal
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arrangement  that  garnered  less  discord.  Husbands  claimed  that  their  remittance  of
bridewealth to the bride’s family meant that their marriage was binding. However, the
court’s ruling for divorce signified that the exchange of bridewealth was not a binding
legal contract. It could be broken if the woman in question insisted on a divorce and had
aligned herself with a suitor able to reimburse her first husband’s bridewealth.
33 Although the court dismissed the claims of first husbands to their wives in many of the
suits of wife kidnapping,  native judges did not declare that rival  men were the legal
husbands without some measure of impunity. In forty-seven percent of cases in which the
court declared a divorce between the wife and her first husband, the court also ordered
the defendant to pay the husband a fine ranging from 2,500 to 5,000 francs48. While the
courts  affirmed that  marriage contracts  could be broken if  a  woman abandoned her
conjugal  home  for  that  of  her  lover,  chiefs  also  sought  to  temper  abandonment  by
imposing heavy financial penalties on a man who settled upon a married woman.
34 The plaintiffs and defendants who are recorded in the case summaries were usually men.
Women, sometimes anonymous and other times identified, and their actions and desires
seep through the transcripts of the court cases as driving the outcome of the question:
who was the legal husband? This is clearest in complaints of wife kidnapping that also
included disagreements over levirate49. Customary laws stated that a widow was to marry
a member of her deceased husband’s family chosen by a family council. Reflecting the
turn towards allowing widows some measure of self-determination, the Mandel Decree of
1939 permitted a  widow to  marry outside  of  her  deceased husband’s  family  without
needing  to  reimburse  bridewealth.  The  published proceedings  of  the  Mitzic  Pahouin
Congress  amended  the  Mandel  Decree  to  qualify  that  she  could  marry  out  of  her
husband’s family if she reimbursed them the bridewealth.
35 In seventy-five percent of cases in which men claimed the right of levirate, the court
allowed the widow to divorce from the family of her deceased husband and marry the
man of her choice50. The caveat was that her new husband reimburse the family of her
deceased husband his original bridewealth. The case of Evoung Nzogo, the heir of the
deceased, versus Mbembang Minko, the lover of a widow, illustrates the typical manner
with which the court decided the question of who was legally her husband: “The widow in
question  categorically  refuses  to  marry  into  the  family  of  her  deceased  husband”51.
Following this indication of will from the widow, the customary court settled the suit by
ordering  the  lover  to  reimburse the  husband’s  family  of  the  original  bridewealth
payment,  thereby paving the way the widow to enter  into a  new marriage.  While  a
customary court presided over by native magistrates was the judicial path that many of
the region’s inhabitants pursued, others chose to present domestic conflict before first
and second degree courts presided over by French intermediaries who also purported to
judge according to customary law.
Marriage and Divorce in Second Degree Courts 
36 It is not possible to know just how many cases regarding marriage made their way before
French judges in Estuary region after World War II. No extant registers of the first degree
court for the Libreville region have survived between 1939 and 1959. Yet, we know that
some litigating parties did indeed seek French intermediaries to settle domestic disputes
because they subsequently appealed judgments made in the first degree court before the
second degree court. A full run of records from the second degree court for the Estuary
region survives from 1939 to 1966, with the exception of 1941-194452. Few of the recorded
cases provide comprehensive transcripts of witness testimony, deliberations considered
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by the judge and assessors, and an explanation for their decisions. Most records merely
include the name of plaintiffs and defendants, the original decision decided upon by the
lower court, and the decision decided upon by the second degree court. Nevertheless,
these sources provide a valuable portrait of the multiple terrains in which conjugal law
and practice were determined.
37 Nearly all litigants bringing cases before the second degree court lived within the city
limits and, as such, the parties before the court reflected the ethnic diversity of Libreville.
The  majority  of  plaintiffs  and  defendants  were  Fang,  but  also  included  Mpongwé,
Gabonese  of  other  ethnicities,  as  well  as  Africans  from other  francophone  colonies.
Litigants were part of the emerging middle class of Libreville since the men were mainly
employed in wage labor by the colonial  state or  private European enterprises.  Their
professions  ranged  from domestic  workers–gardeners,  cooks,  and  drivers–to  masons,
carpenters,  clerks,  teachers,  and  typists.  Some  were  self-employed  as  cultivators,
fishermen, bakers, and foresters. Most women were listed as “without profession”, but
many were maids and one was a midwife. In between 1939 and 1960, the second degree
court presided over thirty four appeals of lower court decisions of conjugal disputes. The
following chart outlines the nature of these disputes.
38 Differences over the terms of the dissolution or contracting of marriage dominated the
court’s  roster–either  struggles  between  men  and  women  and  women’s  families  over
whether or not the money that men had remitted constituted bridewealth or husbands,
wives,  in-laws,  and  lovers  contesting  the  terms  of  a  divorce.  In  contrast  to  cases
presented before the customary court in which women appeared in court represented by
natal  male  custodians,  women represented themselves  directly  before  second degree
courts.  Women initiated twenty-five percent of  the appeals.  Since many of  the city’s
inhabitants originated from regions other than Libreville, many litigants could not or
chose not  to access kin networks to present and mediate their  disagreements.  Many
husbands and wives directly confronted each other in court, without the intermediary of
senior family members,  to individually determine and renegotiate their own conjugal
status.
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39 In an era of socio-economic uncertainty and escalating marriage costs, it was never clear
when  a  prospective  groom  had  completed  a  sufficient  amount  of  payments  that
formalized a legitimate marriage. This question was foundational to settling the terms of
the dissolution of marriages, primarily child custody. As demonstrated in the opening
anecdote to this article, the question of what constituted a marriage could be answered
along a shifting continuum of goods and money exchanged, intent, and mobility. Many of
Libreville’s  male  and  female  residents  entered  into  serial  concubinage  rather  than
marriage  and  it  was  often  challenging  to  distinguish  between  the  two.  Mpongwé
customary law delineated that a man and woman were married, not at the point in which
the groom’s family transferred bridewealth to the bride’s, but at a preceding moment in
which the two families publicly met and agreed upon the marriage. As such, the payment
of bridewealth alone did not legitimatize a marriage and therefore a couple could agree to
divorce without the reimbursement of bridewealth53.
40 For Fang customary law, the definition of what constituted a legitimate marriage was
highly contested. A 1939 first degree court proceeding cited a legitimate marriage in Fang
custom as constituting two elements–the completion of bridewealth and the cohabitation
of the wife and husband in the husband’s residence or in a residence that he had built for
her54.  However, Léon Mba’s study emphasized that,  “the payment of bridewealth to a
woman’s  family  assures  the definitive  possession of  the woman.  Custom permits  the
payment of bridewealth in several payments” (Mba 1938: 73-74). Once two families had
agreed upon the engagement of a man and woman, known as dzanghan, the fiancé began
to  remit  increments  of  gifts  and  services  to  his  in-laws  that  contributed  towards
bridewealth.  Within  Mba’s  definition  when  parties  divorced,  the  reimbursement  of
bridewealth was to include any gifts the husband had given to his wife’s family. Kitchen
utensils and household objects that a husband had given to his wife were deemed to be
her personal  property.  The requirement of  reimbursing bridewealth and gifts  was to
temper the dissolution of marriages, given that a divorce was not final until the entire
amount  had  been  reimbursed  to  the  husband.  However,  in  1942,  Governor-General
Laurentinie stated that a husband’s supplemental obligations to his in-laws were separate
from bridewealth. The supplements, he argued, “which are greedily demanded from the
husband are gifts, and sometimes represent penalties”55. As demonstrated in these varied
interpretations  of  bridewealth,  the  line  between  what  constituted  bridewealth  that
formalized a marriage, versus gifts that reflected the efforts of a suitor to gain the favor
of his prospective bride and in-laws, versus compensation of a lover to his concubine for
the domestic and sexual services she rendered was often blurred. It  was this moving
boundary that often set the parameters within which French judges determined whether
a relationship was a legitimate marriage, an engagement, or concubinage.
41 The second degree court sought to establish the example that women and their families
who committed bridewealth fraud–entering into a marriage contract by accepting cash
and  goods  from a  suitor  and  then  keeping  the  money  and  the  bride–would  not  be
tolerated. In 1960, Memvie Memba was ordered by the first degree court to reimburse his
daughter’s suitor Joseph Amvame the 13,335 francs he had accepted as bridewealth plus a
penalty of 10,000 francs as restitution for the fraud56. Memba appealed the case, but the
second degree court confirmed the lower court’s decision and increased the fine to 12,500
francs, the fine almost equaling the bridewealth amount.
42 Reflecting  the  colonial  alarm  that  escalating  bridewealth  and  attempts  by  women’s
families to extract money and goods contributed to the instability of African families,
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administrators  presiding  over  the  secondary  court  inclined  towards  regarding  the
remittance of goods or cash to a woman and her family as constituting bridewealth, and
therefore  a  legitimate  marriage  or  the  intent  to  marry.  Determining  whether  a
relationship was concubinage, an engagement, or a legitimate marriage was the first step
in settling the domestic conflicts presented before the court. The 1958 case of Augustin
Mougangue  versus  Pauline  Babina,  his  former  lover,  involved  such  a  quandary57.
Mougangue appealed the decision of the first degree court that negated his contention
that he and Babina had been legitimately married and the gifts and cash he had given to
her  family  constituted  bridewealth.  The  first  degree  court  denied  his  claim  to
reimbursement  of  35,975  francs  stating  that  she  was  his  concubine,  not  his  wife.
Concubinage did not include an agreement to marry, thus any gifts given to a woman or
her  family  by  her  lover  was  compensation for  the  sexual  and domestic  services  she
rendered. She did not have to reimburse him in the case of dissolution of the relationship.
However, the second degree court reversed this decision, determining that Mougangue
had given 11,700 francs to Babina’s family and that this constituted bridewealth58. The
court  pronounced  a  divorce  between  the  two  and  ordered  Babina  to  reimburse
Mougangue his bridewealth consisting of 10,000 francs, a thermos, and household objects
59. In contrast, formal engagement or marriage was a contract in which rights in persons
over the woman in question were to be transferred to her husband, and therefore she
owed him reimbursement of bridewealth to rectify his loss of her person and progeny
should the relationship be dissolved.
43 Disagreements  over  monetary  compensation  propelled  both  husbands  and  wives  to
appeal divorce judgments made by the first degree court. Like the customary court, the
second degree court granted divorces in cases in which women had lovers who could
reimburse her husband’s bridewealth, yet also sought to censure men who entered into a
marriage  by  dissolving  one  which  already  existed60.  Women,  their  lovers,  or  family
members  appealed  decisions  on  the  grounds  that  bridewealth  amounts  awarded  to
former husbands were deliberately inflated and they contested additional fines assessed
for  adultery  or  abandonment.  Husbands  appealed  decisions  on  the  ground  that
bridewealth amounts were higher than what the court had determined or to ask for
additional fines. Such was the case of Jean-Francois Bekale who appealed the decision by
the first degree court that both he and his wife Essone Ebone were at fault in the divorce
and for Ebone to reimburse her husband 5,000 francs as bridewealth61. The second degree
court took a more drastic course, augmenting the bridewealth to be reimbursed to 7,500
and ordering Ebone to pay a fee of 13,000 francs to Bekale for adultery. In cases in which
the dissolution of the marriage was due to adultery or abandonment by the wife, the first
degree  court  often  assessed  the  lover  or  her  family  a  fine  in  addition  to  the
reimbursement  of  bridewealth.  The  second  degree  court  sought  to  impose  further
impunity upon guilty parties and augmented these fines when deciding upon appeals62.
However,  disagreements  over  bridewealth  amounts  were  not  simply  about  monetary
compensation, but over the rights in and of persons that the remuneration of bridewealth
entailed.  Even  more  so  than  rights  of  husbands  over  wives,  disagreements  over
bridewealth and divorce centered around struggles over rights in children.
44 The most contentious aspect of settling a divorce remained that of child custody. Men
and  women  alike  identified  having  children  as  of  significant  importance,  for  both
affective and pragmatic reasons. In theory, codified accounts of customary law rendered
the matter of child custody after the dissolution of a relationship cut and dry. In a 1948
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second degree court hearing involving a man and a woman claiming custody of a child,
the judge and assessors cited Mba’s “Coutumier Fang” as their guidebook63. In deciding
upon disputes over children, Mba quoted the Fang proverb, “Mone asse mona mbiè, mone
ane  mona biki” (a  child does  not  belong to whomever is  the biological  father,  but  to
whomever gave the bridewealth). This proverb established that a man who paid or had
begun to pay bridewealth towards a particular woman established rights not only over
her person, but over her progeny. For the Mpongwé, in order to exercise paternal rights
over  a  child, a  man  was  required  to  have  paid  the  entire  agreed-upon  bridewealth
(Augagneur 1923). Thus, a woman who divorced could not take her children with her
since her former husband retained physical and legal custody. On the flip side of this
proverb, a man who had not remitted bridewealth had no rights to his child, though he
was the biological  father64.  Any children born out of  relationships that had not been
legitimated with the payment of bridewealth remained in the custody of the woman’s
family. This tenet held true, not only among the Fang, but other Gabonese ethnicities as
well. In patrilineal societies, a woman’s father would retain custodial authority of her
child, while a woman’s uncle would do so in a matrilineal society. Yet, as argued in this
article, the idea of what constituted bridewealth, and marriage itself, was continually in
flux, thereby providing room for maneuverability in determining child custody.
45 Some women struggling  to  keep custody of  their  children after  the  dissolution of  a
marriage challenged the very custom that child custody was to be based on the transfer
of bridewealth. Such was the case of Eyang Emane who appealed a divorce ruling with her
husband Philippe Mouloungui in which the first degree court awarded him “all the rights
associated  with  paternal  custody”65.  Emane  proposed  a  new  formulation  of  parental
rights based on biology. She argued that Mouloungui was not the biological father and
her indisputable status as the mother of the child entitled her to legal custody. Emane
asserted, “I ask the court to keep custody of the child. I was already pregnant by someone
else when I married Mouloungui. The child belongs to me”. However, the second degree
court confirmed the lower court’s decision to grant custody to Mouloungui, affirming the
tenet that custody of a child born in the instance of marriage would go to the man who
was paying the bridewealth.
46 Men and women struggling for  custody of  children bolstered the legitimacy of  their
appeal based on the question of whether monies and goods transferred between their
families were bridewealth. Men appealed to the court for custody grounds that they had
entered into a formal agreement to marry and had begun to give bridewealth to women’s
families that legitimatized their rights over children66. Women appealed to the court for
custody on the grounds that their “husbands” had not completed bridewealth payments,
thereby  rendering  their  relationship  concubinage (ebone) in  which  women’s  families
retained rights over children.
47 The case of Joseph N’Goua versus Marie-Thérèse Betoe is particularly illustrative of how
malleable defining marriage, and therefore rights over children, could be in the varied
levels of the native court system. Records of this lawsuit exist in both the registers of the
conciliation court for the city of Libreville and second degree court. In August of 1956,
N’Goua went before the conciliation of the city of Libreville requesting that the court
annul a decision made by the customary court in the neighborhood of Atong-Abé67. The
customary court forfeited him of custody of  children born during his relationship to
Marie-Thérèse  Betoe.  N’Goua  argued  that  the  customary  court  had  superceded  its
mandate since the court did not have the power to decide upon filiation. He argued that
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he and Betoe had been legitimately married and demanded custody of the two children
born during the marriage and the reimbursement of 4,500 francs he paid as bridewealth.
Betoe countered that “she did not acknowledge that she had ever been Joseph’s wife; in
consequence she unconditionally refuses to confer the children to him”. The suit made its
way to the first degree court where the judge annulled the customary court’s decision.
The judge ruled that N’Goua and Betoe had been married, recognizing N’Goua’s paternity,
but did not order that Betoe return the children to him68. Upon N’Goua’s appeal of the
decision,  the  secondary  court  acknowledged  that  paternal  authority  in  Fang  custom
meant that N’Goua retained sole legal and physical custody of the children. The second
degree court ordered them to be returned to his home.  In other disputes over child
custody, whether a divorce was the fault of the husband or wife, the second degree court
ruled  to  attribute  children to  their  father  in  instances  in  which  they  judged that  a
marriage had been legitimized by the transfer of bridewealth69. In following the custom
that the flow of bridewealth determined child custody, the court divided the custody of
individual children between their mother and father based on when bridewealth had
been paid. For example, in the suit of Paul Bekale versus his wife Marie-Louise Condja, the
second degree court determined that their first two children were born before they were
legitimately married70. Condja was to retain custody of these two while the subsequent
three children, born during their marriage, were to go to Bekale.
48 Counter to the discourse of enforcing a rigid view of conjugal and sexual relations as
determined by the commercial exchange of monetary bridewealth and “ownership” of
women by  men,  native  courts  were  not  merely  apparatuses  of  a  colonial-patriarchy
alliance.  Conceding  to  women’s  desires  to  leave  undesired  marriages,  African  judges
allowed for divorce provided that the husband was duly compensated for his loss. Yet, in
disputes  over  children,  African  courts  ruled  that  the  payment  of  bridewealth  was  a
binding contract  that  inextricably bound children to their  father’s  lineages.  Defining
conjugal  practice  involved  struggles  to  define  masculinity  as  well  as  women’s  roles.
Conflicts erupted not only between husbands and wives, but also between men competing
for  rights  and  access  to  the  same woman,  thereby  demonstrating  the  cracks  in  the
patriarchal edifice. Status and generational tension between senior and junior men, men
with ready access to cash and those without, created spaces for women to demand more
fluid definitions of marriage in a period in which those in power sought to restrict their
maneuverability.  However,  women  were  not  mere  pawns  awarded  to  the  winner  in
litigation, yet shaped their legal and conjugal status through strategic alliances with male
kin and chosen lovers and through independent income.
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NOTES
1. ANG (Archives nationales du Gabon), Register #91, Répertoires des collections de
Registres divers, Tribunal indigène du 1er degré. Registres des Audiences publiques
conciliation, commune de Libreville, Case #91, Bernard Koula versus Michel Ondo, April 9,
1956.
2. According to Fang customary law, “in the state of concubinage, the woman is free to
make use of herself as she likes”. Letter #442, Chef p.i. du Département de l’Estuaire, Yves
Saint-Alary to the Governor of Gabon, August 25, 1942.
3. In her research on marriage in colonial Niger, Barbara Cooper argues that most marital
conflict in African families are settled in “local fora” and not in courts (COOPER 1997:18).
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4. In early twentieth century Assante, ALLMAN & TASHJIAN (2000: xxxviii) argue that
women, “negotiated [a] shifting customary terrain at particular historical moments, by
defending older formulations of custom in court or demanding new ones”. For other
examples of this literature see: WRIGHT (1982), BYFIELD (2000), HAWKINS (2002), SHADLE
(1999, 2003), ROBERTS (1991, 2005).
5. ÉBOUÉ (1942: 20) argued that African judges should decide such cases: “The first
consists in allowing questions of state of persons–marriage, divorce, adultery, attribution
of natural children, inheritance–to be settled in the first instance by native judges alone.
They can do this much better than us. We have generally brought about a certain
weakness in the settling of such matters, especially in that which concerns adultery and
divorce. On the pretext that the woman was not free enough before marriage, with our
repugnance to punish adultery and our ease in pronouncing divorce, we have given her a
license in marriage that is completely excessive. Native judges, officially reinvested with
civil competence, will put all of this into order and they will teach us to not inculcate
them with our conceptions, but to simply control the correct application of theirs, as they
have evolved, notably under the influence of Christian law.”
6. At some point the governor wanted to have separate courts by ethnic group, but the
attorney general warned against this, citing the revolts that occurred in Nigeria in
1925-28 when they tried to do the same thing. Governor General Bayardelle cautioned
administrators to ensure that, “customary judges are frequently and attentively
controlled”. ANG, Microfilm 51-MI-65-2, Bulletin de Renseignements politiques,
septembre 1946.
7. CAOM (Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence), aef/ggaef/5D56,
Documentation sur le mariage africain en AEF, 10 juillet 1950.
8. In a letter to all the governors of FEA colonies Bayardelle suggested that divorces only
be granted in cases of sterility, congenital malformation, incurable disease, brutal
violence, and traditional unpardonable insults. Further dismissing the need to consult
with native assessors, Bayardelle closed the letter asking the governors to respond right
away to his recommendations, without the need to consult with “native collaborators”.
CAOM, aef/ggaef/5D56, Circulaire du GG de l’AEF à Messieurs les Gouverneurs Chefs de
Territoire, Libreville, Bangui, Fort-Lamy, et Brazzaville, 5 février 1946.
9. CAOM, aef/ggaef/5D56, Letter 391, Lettre du GG de l’AEF à Messieurs les Chefs des
territoires Gabon, Moyen-Congo, Oubangui-Chari, 6 juillet 1948.
10. CAOM, aef/ggaef/5D56, Letter 391, Lettre du GG de l’AEF à Messieurs les Chefs des
territoires Gabon, Moyen Congo, Oubangui-Chari, 6 juillet 1948.
11. CAOM, aef/ggaef/5D56, Circulaire du GG de l’AEF à Messieurs les Gouverneurs Chefs
des territoires, Libreville, Bangui, Fort-Lamy, et Brazzaville, 5 février 1946.
12. ANG, 146, Letter 418, Lettre de l’Administrateur des Colonies, H. Tastevin, Chef de la
circonscription de l’Estuaire à Monsieur le Chef de la subdivision de Libreville, 27 juin
1944.
13. The commander urged administrators to maintain a frequent presence in the halls
where chiefs were presiding over conciliation cases since their presence would increase
the authority of the chiefs in relation to litigants. In particular, the commander urged
that administrators watch over and keep control over two African men identified as
Corporal Guimbi and the interpreter Mathurin who often criticized decisions settled upon
by the assessors. ANG, 146, Letter 418, lettre de l’Administrateur des Colonies, H. Tastevin,
Chef de la circonscription de l’Estuaire à Monsieur le Chef de la subdivision de Libreville,
27 juin 1944.
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14. In a 1939 political report, the head of the Estuary region complained about
the number of palavers he had to deal with. Though colonial administrators directed
people towards conciliation hearings, parties in disputes were constantly challenging the
judgments of chiefs in conciliation court and coming to him to resolve. He argued that
they need to reestablish a court with a European intermediary. ANG, Microfilm Reel 51-
MI-75, Rapport politique du deuxième semestre de l’Estuaire 1939.
15. ANG, 164, Audience du 29 janvier 1943, doléances des Chefferies, communes et
subdivision, 29 janvier 1943.
16. ANG, Register #112, Afrique équatoriale française, région de l’estuaire, Registre des
jugements, Tribunal Coutumier, année 1950 du 4 novembre 1950 au 1er mai 1955.
17. The category of cases heard by year is as follows: 1950: 0 wife kidnapping, 3 adultery,
0 abandonment, 0 bridewealth, 0 levirate, 1 divorce, 0 compensation, 0 marriage
agreement; 1951: 5 wife kidnapping, 7 adultery, 7 abandonment, 7 bridewealth, 3 levirate,
0 divorce, 1 compensation, 0 marriage agreement; 1952: 5 wife kidnapping, 4 adultery, 5
abandonment, 2 bridewealth, 2 levirate, 1 divorce, 1 compensation, 0 marriage
agreement; 1953: 11 wife kidnapping, 4 adultery, 1 abandonment, 2 bridewealth, 1
levirate, 1 divorce, 0 compensation, 1 marriage agreement; 1954: 6 wife kidnapping, 9
adultery, 4 abandonment, 4 bridewealth, 2 levirate, 2 divorce, 2 compensation, 0 marriage
agreement; 1955: 2 wife kidnapping, 0 adultery, 4 abandonment, 2 bridewealth, 0 levirate,
0 divorce, 0 compensation, 0 marriage agreement. ANG, Register #112, Registre des
jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
18. Even in these cases in which the husband came to court petitioning for a divorce and
the reimbursement of bridewealth, husbands only did so because it was their wives who
first asked for a divorce. These husbands had attempted to reconcile with their wives and
the women refused. Women had absconded with other men or taken refuge at the home
of kin. Husbands went to court more crucially in oder to seek reimburesement of
bridewealth. See Case #3 December 1, 1950; Case #66 April 2, 1952; Case #20 November 26,
1953; Case #147 June 1, 1954; See Case #168 December 1, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre
des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
19. See for example case #11 January 4, 1951; Case #23 February 2, 1951; Case #24 February
2, 1951; Case #28 May 15, 1951; Case #148 June 15, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des
jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
20. Colonial administrators in other colonies also argued that women guilty of adultery
should be directly punished with prison or fines, rather than fining her accomplice. An
administrator in Congo wrote, “in my opinion sanctions must be the same for the wife as
for her accomplice. To act differently would encourage prostitution, and to a certain
extent, vagrancy since complicit husbands, and there is no lack of them, especially in
laborer’s workshops, count on the systematic indulgence of the courts towards women to
blackmail their wives’ lovers by threatening them with a suit in court”. CAOM, aef/
ggaef/5D56, lettre du Chef du département de Pool (Congo) à Monsieur le GG, chargé de
l’Adminstration du territoire du Moyen-Congo, référence: lettre #20 AP.2 du 5 février
1946 au sujet des divorces indigenes, 4 avril 1947.
21. Articles 336, 337, and 338 of the Penal Code allowed for a prison sentence of 3 months
to two years, for the adulterous wife. In addition to the same term in prison, an
accomplice could also be fined 100-2,000 francs. The only way that a husband could be
convicted of adultery was if he had sexual relations with a woman who was not his wife in
the conjugal home. ANG, 2686 lettre du Procureur général, Chef du service judicaire de
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l’AEF à Messieurs les Chefs du territoire du Gabon, du Moyen-Congo, de l’Oubangui-Chari
et du Tchad, 26 juin 1946.
22. From 1939 to 1955, only three cases of the criminal prosecution of women for adultery
appear in court registers.
23. CSSP, 2D60.2a4, Document #5, Projet de règlement des mariages entre Indigènes de
race Fang, Article XI.
24. In their work on colonial Ghana, ALLMAN & TASHJIAN (2000: 172) also found women to
be marginal to the unfolding of court proceedings on adultery: “Although it was the wife
who often set an adultery case in motion by her confession, she was never a central figure
in the proceedings. Adultery remained a suit, a transaction between men. The husband,
not the woman herself, was considered the person wronged.”
25. For examples, see Case #46 October 15, 1951; Case #63 March 15, 1952; Case #98
February 1, 1953; Case #129 January 15, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements,
Tribunal Coutumier.
26. 1950: Case #2 November 5; Case #5 December 2; Case #6 December 15. 1951: Case #10
January 4; Case #18 February 1; Case #25 February 2; Case #46 October 15; Case #47
October 16; Case #50 November 13. 1952: Case #63 March 15; Case #67 April 15; Case #70
Mai 31; Case #88 December 2. 1953: Case #90 January 5; Case #91 January 5; Case #98
February 1; Case #108 April 16; Case #108 April 16; Case #114 June 16. 1954: Case #129
January 15; Case #130 January 15; Case #133 February 3; Case #143 April 1; Case #145 May
1; Case #150 October 1; Case #161 October 15; Case #164 October 24; Case #169 December 1.
ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
27. Case #133 February 3, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
28. See Case #6 December 15, 1950; Case #63 March 15, 1952; Case #98 February 1, 1953;
Case #145 May 1, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
29. Case #91 January 5, 1953; Case #98; February 1, 1953; Case #108 April 16, 1953; Case
#145 May 1, 1953. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
30. See Case #5 December 2, 1950; Case #67 April 15, 1952; Case #161 October 15, 1954.
ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
31. Men had extensive grounds for divorce: in case of a wife’s repeated adultery,
inveterate laziness in carrying out work dictated by custom, incurable disease caught as a
result of relations with someone other than her husband, witchcraft, and abortio (MBA
1938: 76-77).
32. CSSP, 2D60.2a4 Document #5, Projet de règlement des mariages entre indigènes de
race fang, Article XIII, octobre 1942.
33. Specifically, a second or third wife could ask for a divorce for “serious and proven
motives” such as the desire to marry a single man, if she had been married prior to
puberty, and if she wanted to be baptized. The document defined “severe ill-treatment”
of a wife by her husband as excessive, prolonged and unmotivated abandonment. Another
justification for divorce was the case of spouses who were of different religions and when
one spouse refused to allow the other to practice their religion. CSSP, Projet de
règlement, Article XIII, Octobre 1942.
34. CAOM, aef/ggaef/5D56, lettre du Procureur général chef du service judicaire de l’AEF
à Monsieur le Directeur des Affaires politiques, 31 janvier 1946; CAOM, aef/ggaef/5D56,
lettre du Procureur du Tribunal de 1re Instance de Libreville à Monsieur le Chef du
territoire du Gabon, lettre #494/APS du 29 juillet 1948 relative aux jugements rendus en
1947 en matière de mariage indigène, 30 juin 1948.
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35. See Case #16 Janaury 15, 1951; Case #34 April 16, 1951. ANG, Register #112, Registre des
jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
36. Case #9 January 3, 1950; Case #16 January 19, 1950; Case #34 April 16 1951; Case #142
April 1, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
37. For abandonment cases in which divorce was ruled see: Case #9 January 3, 1950; Case
#16 January 19, 1950; Case #34 April 16 1951; Case #44 July 9, 1951; Case #57 January 9,
1952; Case #60 February 9, 1952; Case #64 April 2, 1952; Case #78 June 30, 1952; Case #92
January 15, 1953; Case #120 November 26, 1953; Case #134 January 15, 1954; Case #142
April 1, 1942; Case #152 October 1, 1954; Case #173 February 1, 1955; Case #176 February
23, 1955; Case #181 May 1, 1955. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
38. As an exception, two rulings for divorce did detail that husbands directly sued their
wives and made no mention of male relatives. In these cases, the wives themselves were
directly charged with reimbursing bridewealth. See Case #173 February 1, 1955; Case #181
May 1, 1955. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
39. Case #60 February 9, 1952. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
40. Case #19 February 1, 1951. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
41. In 1952, a man named Nzé Evore directly brought suit against his wife Eyang
N’Guema, not her relatives, claiming that her desertion and request for divorce were
based on “frivolous grounds”. The court ordered for her to return to the conjugal home.
Perhaps the fact that there were no male relatives present to support her claim led to the
court’s ruling. Case #82 October 16, 1952. For cases in which women were compelled to
return providing that husbands pay wives’ families requested payments see: Case #32
April 16, 1951. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
42. This option was recognized as a legitimate bargaining tool: “A father or one her
relatives is authorized to retain the woman in cases of severe physical cruelty or insults
inflicted upon her by her husband, and in the process of reconciliation, or also in order to
oblige the husband to pay the remainder of bridewealth. The husband must submit to
these demands if they are justified or well-founded” (MBA 1938: 76).
43. Case #32, April 1, 1951. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
44. See also the case of Bivegue Biadong against his father in law Obiang Minko on the
charge of his wife Mengue Bekale’s abandonment. Obiang Minko declared that he would
allow her to return to him if he paid him 2,500 francs. The court ruled, “According to
custom Bivegue Biadong must satisfy Obiang Minko the 2,500 francs and will take back his
wife”. Case #178, April 15, 1955. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
45. Case #94 January 15, 1953; Case #99 February 1, 1953; Case #141 March 22, 1954; Case
#144 May 1, 1954; Case #175 February 15, 1955. ANG, Register #112, Registre des
jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
46. ANG, Register #107, Tribunal indigène de second degré du Département de l’Estuaire,
statuant en matière de justice répressive directe, affaire N’Guema Mba, Rapt de femme,
Case #36, May 10, 1949.
47. In 1951, 1952, and 1954, the court granted a divorce in 100% of the cases involving
rapt de femme in which the wife insisted upon a divorce. However, in 1954, exceptions
occurred in which the court ordered women to return to their husbands in fifty percent
“The Option of the Judicial Path”
Cahiers d’études africaines, 187-188 | 2007
21
of the eight cases involving rapt de femme. Even if the lover had already remitted a
bridewealth payment to the woman’s family, the court her kin to return the rival suitor’s
bridewealth. This one year is the one exception to the general trend of customary courts
to grant divorces in kidnapping cases in which the wife refused to return to her first
husband or had already engaged in rapt one or two times before. ANG, Register #112,
Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
48. Case #9 January 1951; Case #37 May 15, 1951; Case #59 February 3, 1952, January 1953;
Case #113 June 15, 1953; Case #114 June 16, 1953; Case #126 December 12, 1953; Case #128
March 16, 1954; Case #169 November 16, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements,
Tribunal Coutumier.
49. See Case #45 October, 1951; #76 June 30, 1952; #83 December 2, 1952; #134 January 15,
1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal Coutumier.
50. See Case #13 January 16, 1951; Case #31 April 16, 1951; Case #42 July 9, 1951; Case #45
October 16, 1951; Case #69 May 31, 1952; Case #76 June 30, 1952; Case #83 December 2,
1952; Case #134 January 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
51. Case #134, January 15, 1954. ANG, Register #112, Registre des jugements, Tribunal
Coutumier.
52. ANG, Register #106 Département de l’Estuaire, Tribunal indigène du second degré en
matière répressive, civile et commerciale, 25 août 1939-Septembre 1941; Register #112,
Département de l’Estuaire, Tribunal indigène, du second degré en matière répressive,
civile et commerciale 1950-1956; Register #107, Département de l’Estuaire justice
répressive indigène, Tribunal indigène du second degré 1944-1956; Register #116 Registre
du tribunal des premier et second Degré, 1956-1966.
53. ANG, Register #107, Appeal #3, Toussaint Dowet-Pither versus Émilienne Gondjout,
May 23, 1949.
54. ANG, 2DA(I)11, région de l’Estuaire, justice civile indigène, les affaires opposant les
individus traitées au Tribunal du premier degré de la subdivision de Libreville, Jean-
Baptiste Asse Bekale vs. Bekale Mba, 5 mai 1939.
55. ANG, lettre du Gouverneur général de l’Afrique équatoriale française à Monsieur le
Chef du territoire du Gabon, Libreville, #116/APAG, 13 mars 1942.
56. Register #116, Registre du tribunal des premier et second degré, Memvie Memba
versus Joseph Amvame, 16 juillet 1960.
57. Register #116, Registre du tribunal des premier et second degré, Augustin Mougangue
versus Pauline Babina, 7 juin 1958.
58. In setting up concubinage, a suitor often agreed with the woman and a male
representative from her family to give her a certain sum of money to provide for her.
ANG, Register #112, Tribunal indigène du deuxième degré de l’Estuaire, Case #1, 10
octobre 1950, Pauline M’Atanga versus Antoine Figuereido.
59. See also the following cases in which the second degree court reversed decisions by
the first degree court and judged that relationships were either formal engagements or
marriages that entailed the reimbursement of goods or cash to the plaintiff: Vincent
Waga versus Catherine Betoe, November 11, 1959; Maurice Ntoutoume versus Mlle Marie-
Christine, October 31, 1959. Register #116, Registre du tribunal des premier et second
degré.
60. The court assessed the wife and her family or lover an additional fee ranging from
3,000 to 10,000 francs in cases of abandonment or adultery.
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61. ANG, Register #116, Registre du tribunal des premier et second degré, Jean-Francois
Bekale versus Essone Ebone, November 22, 1957.
62. See the following for cases in which the court confirmed or increased bridewealth
amounts and fines to be paid see: Engone-Emane versus André Bekang, January 1, 1958;
Minko Messo versus Jérôme Mba, April 4, 1958; Georgette Youekeni versus Gilles Abeke,
December 20, 1958; 1959: Joseph Tamba versus Mme Flonorine Mobonassi, November 28,
1959; Thomas NGoma-Nkoume versus Mme Hélène Gnigone, October 3, 1959; Joseph
Tamba versus Mme Flonorine Mobossasi, November 28, 1959; Mme Micheline Obiang
Oyame versus Grégoire Bekale, March 5, 1960; Jean-Désiré N’Dong versus Édouard Bekale
N’Doutume, April 16, 1960; Joseph Mba versus Jean-Louis Moret, November 14, 1959. ANG,
Register #116, Registre du tribunal des premier et second degré.
63.ANG, Register #107, Tribunal indigène du second degré de Libreville, Case #1 Eyang
Emane versus Philippe Mouloungui April 16, 1948.
64. A man could establish paternity and rights to his child if he did marry his lover and
paid an additional fine to her family in order to claim paternity (AUGAGNEUR 1923: 17; MBA
1938: 88-89).
65. ANG, Register #107, Registre du tribunal des premier et second degré, Eyang Emane
versus Philippe Mouloungui, April 16, 1948.
66. ANG, 2DA(I)11, Jean-Baptiste Asse Bekale versus Mba Bekale, May 19, 1939.
67. ANG, Register #91, Tribunal indigène de premier degré, Registres des audiences
publiques conciliation, commune de Libreville, Joseph N’Goua versus Marie-Thérèse
Betoe, August 6, 1956.
68. ANG, Register #116, région de l’Estuaire, district de Libreville, Régistre du Tribunal des
premier degré et second degré, Joseph N’Goua versus Marie-Thérèse Betoe, December 7,
1956.
69. See the following suits: Paul Eman Richard versus Juliette Eto, January 4, 1957; El Hadj
Mhamadou Bekale Ignace versus Louis Nang Obame, November 15, 1957; Paul Bekale
versus Mme Bekale Marie-Louise Condja, January 1, 1958; N’Zé Mba versus Justin Bekale,
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ABSTRACTS
This article analyzes extant records of the multi-layered native court system from 1939 to 1959 in
Libreville, Gabon to argue that what constituded marriage and rights-in-wives was fluid in this
era of socio-economic change. In the post-World War II era, the French struggled to establish a
native court system, alternatively emphazing African and French arbitrators, to enforce rigid
ideas of customary marriage law. Additionally, in villages and neighborhoods in the Libreville
region, senior men presided over courts not officially recognized by the colonial Qtate. Gabonese
men  and  women–husbands,  wives,  lovers,  fathers,  uncles,  brothers,  and  in-laws–sought  out
varied judicial arenas to negotiate conflict over marriage, divorce, adultery, and child custody.
Rather  than  enforcing  rigid  legal  judgements  of  what  constituted  legitimate  marriage,
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judgements rendered by these varied courts provided maneuverability for women and men to
negotiate marital status.
« L’option de la voie juridique ». Conflits portant sur le mariage, le divorce et les rapports sexuels en dehors
du  mariage  dans  les  tribunaux  coloniaux  de  Libreville,  Gabon  1939-1959. – À  l’appui  de  documents
d’époque issus des multiples niveaux des tribunaux indigènes de Libreville (Gabon) de 1939 à
1959, cet article avance qu’il est difficile d’identifier ce que constituaient le mariage et le droit
sur  les  femmes  à  cette  période  de  changement  socio-économique.  Après  la  Seconde  Guerre
mondiale, les Français se sont efforcés de mettre en place un système judiciaire indigène mettant
l’accent alternativement sur les  médiateurs africains et  français  pour inculquer les  principes
d’une loi coutumière sur le mariage. En revanche, dans les villages et les quartiers de la région de
Libreville, des Anciens jouaient le rôle d’arbitres dans des tribunaux qui n’étaient pas reconnus
par l’État colonial. Gabonais et Gabonaises – maris et femmes, amants, pères, oncles, frères et
belle-famille –  s’efforçaient  de  trouver  toutes  sortes  de  terrains  juridiques  pour  arbitrer  les
conflits  en  matière  de  mariage,  de  divorce,  d’adultère  et  de  garde  parentale.  Ces  tribunaux
indigènes offraient aux hommes et aux femmes un espace de manœuvre dans la négociation de
leur statut conjugal.
INDEX
Mots-clés: femmes, droit, mariage, genre, droit coutumier, droit colonial, Gabon, Libreville
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